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Introduction
A lecture and seminar series on the Economics of Interna 
tional Migration, and a public lecture on illegal aliens, are 
very timely. As a research topic, immigration has long been 
the concern of historians and sociologists. It is only in recent 
years about a decade ago that economists returned to this 
topic.
Economists were concerned with the issue at the turn of 
the century and up to the early 1920s until the enactment of 
the "national origins" quota system. From then until the 
1960s, there was little public policy concern or debate over 
general immigration issues, and this is reflected by the virtual 
absence of interest in the subject by economists. The 1965 
Immigration Amendments abolished the "national origins" 
quota system and substituted a "preference system" which 
placed greatest emphasis on kinship with a U.S. citizen or 
resident alien. But this was done with surprising little public 
debate and with a continued virtual vacuum in the economic 
literature.
It was only in the 1970s that there was a renewed public 
policy interest in immigration issues. Although the policy in 
terest focused on illegal immigration, economic research 
took a broader approach, exploring all dimensions of im 
migrant adjustment and impact, for both legal and illegal 
aliens.
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After a decade of high energy prices, sharply fluctuating 
rates of economic growth, high and erratic rates of inflation, 
and increased concerns for the quality of the environment, 
there is now a greater realization that resources are limited 
and that continued economic growth is not a gift from the 
gods, but rather is dependent on a public policy that fosters 
rather than hinders economic growth. All public policy 
issues once thought outside the realm of economic thinking 
or economic considerations are coming under closer 
scrutiny, including immigration policy.
Economists have demonstrated that immigrant flows are, 
in part, the consequence of economic forces. They have also 
demonstrated that immigrants play an important and com 
plex role in the economy in general and in the labor market 
in particular. In addition, economists have demonstrated 
that immigrants impact on the well-being of the economy 
and the American population.
This lecture will be on the contradictions and dilemmas in 
herent in forming public policy toward illegal aliens. In so 
doing it will point to the direction of sounder policy solu 
tions.
The Illegal Alien Debate
The most recent public focus on immigration has been 
with respect to illegal aliens. From the last days of the Ford 
administration to the present, each session of Congress has 
given serious consideration to the enactment of legislation to 
grant amnesty to illegal aliens living in the U.S., to impose 
for the first time federal sanctions on employers of illegal 
aliens, and to strengthen enforcement at the border. In 1984 
both houses of Congress passed such legislation, by a large 
majority in the Senate and by a handful of votes in the 
House. Because of minor differences, the legislation went to 
a House/Senate conference committee where it died, in no
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small part because of the newly expressed opposition of both 
presidential candidates.
The persistence with which the legislation is brought for 
ward, the heated debate, the widely divergent support in the 
House and Senate, and the periodic changes in position of 
presidents and presidential candidates suggests that illegal 
aliens are a difficult policy issue.
Illegal aliens exist because workers are attracted to the 
United States by jobs provided by the economy and because 
there is an incomplete enforcement of immigration law by 
the government. They impact on the labor market by 
decreasing the earnings and employment opportunities of 
some U.S. workers and increasing them for other U.S. 
workers. The size of the illegal alien population is believed to 
be large and growing. It has recently been estimated by three 
Census Bureau statisticians that 3 to 6 million illegal aliens 
were residing in the United States in 1980 (Siegel, Passel and 
Robinson, 1981). It is also estimated that half of these illegal 
aliens are Mexican nationals. Every indication suggests that 
the continued deterioration of the Mexican economy and 
political upheavals in Central and South America will be fur 
ther spurs to illegal immigration.
Yet, we know surprisingly little about illegal aliens. Why is 
there such a large illegal alien population? Why is there so 
little research on the topic? Indeed, the Select Commission 
on Immigration and Refugee Policy, which issued its report 
in 1981, was established primarily to analyze policy regard 
ing illegal aliens and the Commission devoted most of its 
recommendations to this issue. Yet, it funded no research 
relating to the characteristics or impact of illegal aliens. Its 
research program played no apparent role in its policy deci 
sions.
There is a legislative stalemate in Washington. Too few 
resources are budgeted to enforcement for the Immigration
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and Naturalization Service (INS) to have any substantial im 
pact. Yet, there is an unwillingness to publicly acknowledge 
this "lack of will" and offer amnesty. This public am 
bivalence has been quite obvious for at least a decade.
The legislative stalemate may not represent a lack of will, 
but rather may be interpreted as a "rational" short-run 
response to a policy dilemma. We want foreign workers, but 
not their dependents. We allow illegal migration but keep the 
probability of arrest and deportation high enough to 
discourage the entry of family members. Amnesty, of 
course, would allow erstwhile illegal aliens to bring their 
dependents spouse, minor children, aged parents to the 
United States. This would given them access to our system of 
free public education as well as to the generous welfare and 
social service benefits that were designed to help Americans 
disadvantaged through no fault of their own. (The welfare 
benefits include Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC), Food Stamps, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
and Medicaid.) Because we want the workers but not the 
dependents, and we find it awkward to say so openly, we 
perpetuate a cat-and-mouse game between the immigration 
authorities and illegal aliens.
If this interpretation is correct, we need not be concerned 
with more information on illegal aliens. We prefer continued 
obfuscation of the issues to the embarrassment that clarifica 
tion might bring. It is apparently better to let the monster 
sleep. Unfortunately, the monster will eventually wake up, 
and more massive social and economic problems may be at 
hand a large, restless and low-skilled illegal alien popula 
tion.
Characteristics of Illegal Aliens1
To put these matters in historical perspective, it is impor 
tant to indicate that the illegal alien issue is not new. In this
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decade we "celebrate" the 100th anniversary of illegal aliens 
in the United States. The first illegal aliens were Chinese 
because the first barriers to legal immigration were imposed 
against unskilled Chinese workers in the 1880s. There was a 
racist fear of the "Yellow Peril," of hoards of unskilled 
Chinese workers flooding California and depressing wages 
for similarly unskilled whites. It is unlikely that the feared 
massive migration would have taken place even if there were 
no barriers. Perhaps more intriguing, data from recent cen 
suses indicate that the descendants of the Chinese workers 
have achieved higher levels of schooling, occupational status 
and earnings than the descendants of the whites who a cen 
tury ago believed the Chinese could never be anything but 
unskilled laborers.
In the twentieth century, however, the main focus has 
been on Mexican illegal aliens. A cyclical pattern has emerg 
ed. During periods of political turmoil (e.g., 1910 Revolu 
tion) or economic slack in Mexico, large migration streams 
flow northward, and the size of these streams seems to have 
accelerated in recent decades. On the other hand, during 
periods of economic slack in the U.S., the northward flow is 
slowed or stopped, and sometimes reversed. In the recession 
following the World War I boom, during the early 1930s, 
and during the early 1950s, the net flow may have been 
toward Mexico, that is, the number of Mexican nationals 
who left the U.S. may have exceeded the number who 
entered this country. These reverse flows have sometimes 
been generated by wholesale arrests and deportations of per 
sons who "look Mexican."
Mexican nationals form the bulk of the illegal alien 
population in the 1980s the data on apprehensions in 
dicates that 90 percent are Mexican nationals. But this 
statistic overstates the proportion of Mexicans in the illegal 
alien population. Immigration and Naturalization Service
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concentrates its resources along the Mexican border, perhaps 
(as some allege) because it is relatively inexpensive to catch 
people sneaking across the border and deport them. In addi 
tion, many Mexican illegal aliens work in the United States 
only part of the year and return to Mexico during the slack 
season. Since apprehensions are most likely to take place at 
or shortly after entry, this to and fro migration also raises 
the proportion of Mexican nationals in the arrest data 
relative to the stock of illegal aliens residing in the U.S.
It is believed that about half of the illegal alien population 
living in the United States are Mexican nationals, and that 
the other half come from a wide range of countries and all 
parts of the globe. West Indians, Central and South 
Americans, East Asians, South Asians, Africans, Near 
Easterners, Europeans and Canadians are all represented 
among illegal aliens. Of the Mexican illegal aliens, about 70 
percent originate in six states of Mexico's Central Plateau. 
This is a poor area which served as a battlefield during the 
revolutions and rebellions earlier in this century, and which 
has been passed over by whatever benefits emerged from the 
Green Revolution of the 1950s and the short-lived oil bonan 
za in the 1970s (Cross and Sandos, 1981).
There are reasons why Mexico provides the largest number 
of illegal aliens. We share a border about 2,000 miles long 
which runs through wilderness areas. Where rivers form part 
of the border they are often shallow and easy to cross. 
Hence, "entry without inspection" is relatively easy for 
Mexican nationals. Illegal aliens from most other countries 
either use fraudulent documents to enter the U.S. or have to 
violate a legal visa, such as working in violation of a student 
or visitor visa, or overstaying their visa. Increasingly, na 
tionals of other countries are using Mexico and Canada for 
the purpose of surreptitiously entering the United States.
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Ease of entry may be a necessary condition for illegal im 
migration, but it is not a sufficient explanation. After all, the 
border with Canada is as easy to cross as the border with 
Mexico, yet there are relatively few Canadian illegal aliens: 
less than 1 percent of apprehended illegal aliens are Cana 
dian nationals. Nor are legal immigrants more numerous 
from Canada than from Mexico. In recent years there have 
been fewer than 15,000 Canadian immigrants annually, 
while legal immigrants from Mexico have exceeded 55,000 
annually.
The U.S.-Mexican border is unique. No other border 
separates two countries that differ so sharply in average in 
come. The temptation to go north to "strike it rich" working 
as a busboy, a dishwasher, or fruit picker is just too strong to 
resist. Mexico's economy has not done well in the 20th cen 
tury in spite of its abundance of natural resources. High fer 
tility rates combined with falling death rates, particularly in 
fant mortality rates, have generated large cohorts of youths. 
Government development policy has focused on capital- 
intensive rather than labor-intensive sectors of the economy. 
Mismanagement of the economy has retarded the rate of 
economic growth. The poverty and absence of job oppor 
tunities, particularly in the rural areas, have generated a 
massive migration to Mexico City, the border towns, and the 
United States.
Many Mexican farm workers gained experience working in 
the United States in the bracero program.This was a contract 
farm labor program started in 1942 to augment wartime 
labor supplies and was terminated in 1964. As a result of the 
experience gained in the bracero program, hundreds of 
thousands of Mexican farm workers had their appetites 
whetted for the good life up north. They, their younger 
brothers, their sons became illegal aliens when the bracero 
program ended and other opportunities for legal migration
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were reduced. Indeed, in the face of a growing supply of im 
migrants from Mexico the imposition of the numerical ceil 
ings on Western Hemisphere immigration in 1968, and the 
country ceilings in 1977, reduced avenues for legal migra 
tion, thereby generating pressures for increased illegal im 
migration.
There is little solid data on the demographic or labor 
market characteristics of illegal aliens (Chiswick 1984). The 
data on apprehensions suggest they are predominately low- 
skilled, young adult (age 18 to 30), males from Mexico. 
While it is undoubtedly true that the apprehensions data can 
be expected to exaggerate these very characteristics, it seems 
reasonable that qualitatively these characterizations are ac 
curate. Illegal aliens tend to be unskilled, in part because 
workers in higher skilled jobs may have more difficulty in 
masking their illegal status, and in part because an occupa 
tional license, certification or union membership may be re 
quired. In addition, because of the existence of skills that are 
specific to the country in which they are acquired, apprehen 
sions and deportations may be more costly for skilled illegal 
aliens than for workers with few if any skills. Thus, among 
unsuccessful visa applicants (or potential applicants) those 
with few or no skills have the greater incentive to attempt an 
illegal entry.
The skewed demographic composition of illegal aliens and 
the high rate of to and fro migration, particularly with 
respect to Mexico, are consequences of illegal alien workers 
leaving their wives, young children and aged parents in the 
home country. This does not arise from their preferences, 
but from the circumstances of their illegal status. Dependent 
family members are costly to move to the United States, par 
ticularly if illegal means are to be used. Once in the U.S., the 
dependents may not confer the eligibility for welfare and 
social service benefits that legal residents may receive. In-
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deed, the dependents may increase the probability of the en 
tire family being apprehended and deported, thereby increas 
ing the costs and risks of deportation.
Alternative Policies: Amnesty Versus 
Strict Enforcement
If illegal alien workers were granted amnesty and could 
bring their dependents to the U.S., the demographic 
characteristics of this population would change. The extent 
of to and fro migration would decline, the ratio of 
dependents to workers would increase, and, because of the 
low skill level, the family members would be eligibile for a 
variety of welfare (income transfer) and social service pro 
grams. In addition, the incentive for even more families to 
move north would increase under the realistic view that if 
amnesty is granted once it will be granted again. Hence, the 
case against amnesty.
But what about a more vigorous enforcement of immigra 
tion law? The trends have, if anything, been in the opposite 
direction (Chiswick 1981/82). The number of permanent 
positions in the Immigration and Naturalization Service in 
creased from 7,000 in 1960 to nearly 11,000 in 1979, a 60 per 
cent increase. During the same period, however, the annual 
number of legal immigrants doubled from one-quarter of a 
million per year to one-half of a million. Nonimmigrant ad 
missions of aliens as tourists, students, etc. increased 8-fold, 
from 1.1 million to 9.3 million per year. And, the number of 
apprehensions of illegal aliens increased 14-fold, from 
70,000 to about one million. Clearly a tremendous strain has 
been placed on INS resources.
To try to close the floodgates, INS has concentrated its 
resources on border enforcement at the expense of interior 
enforcement. However, there is a revolving door at the 
border in which large numbers of illegal aliens are ap-
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prehended one night, to be deported the next day, to try 
again on a subsequent night. Except for deportation, there 
are no penalties imposed on illegal aliens, even those who are 
flagrant repeat offenders. The cat-and-mouse game along 
the border increases apprehensions per million dollars of 
budget expenditure, but may have little deterrent effect.
Benefits of Current Policy
What are the benefits of current policy? The benefits come 
in the form of the increase in income to the native population 
of the U.S. from a larger pool of low-skilled immigrant 
workers. An increase in the supply of low-skilled foreign 
workers depresses the wages and working conditions of low- 
skilled native workers, and this receives much public atten 
tion. What receives less public notice is that the increase in 
the number of low-skilled workers increases the productivity 
of "complementary factors of production," that is, higher 
skilled workers and capital. Any factor of production is 
more productive the more of other factors with which it can 
work. A bulldozer on a road construction project is more 
productive if there are more workers to keep it running 24 
hours a day, repair it when it breaks down, and redirect traf 
fic away from the construction site. A scientist is more pro 
ductive if there are assistants to clean the test tubes, run sim 
ple experiments, do bibliographic research, type 
manuscripts, etc.
The gains in income to skilled workers and capital from 
the migration of low-skilled workers are likely to exceed the 
losses to native low-skilled workers. 2 This means that as a 
result of low-skilled illegal migration, the income of the 
native U.S. population is increased!
The Policy Dilemma
I have outlined the policy dilemma. As a result of restric 
tions on immigration, there are a large number of people in
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the U.S. illegally, perhaps 3 to 6 million people. They are 
disproportionately unskilled young adult males from Mex 
ico. Largely because of their illegal status, they do not bring 
their dependent family members. These workers are produc 
tive and they increase the income of the native U.S. popula 
tion.
On the other hand, if they brought their dependent family 
members with them they would be eligible for a variety of 
welfare, social service and educational programs. Since the 
workers are low-skilled, their use of these benefits could ex 
ceed the increased income of the native population. That is, 
the increase in taxes needed to pay for these programs for the 
dependents of the "illegal aliens" might easily exceed the 
gains in income to the native population.
With their status legalized, illegal aliens could bring their 
dependents to the U.S. and claim benefits from the variety of 
public programs that subsidize the poor, the young and the 
aged. Further, amnesty would encourage further illegal im 
migration because of the realistic expectation that if offered 
once it will be offered repeatedly. Hence, amnesty is perceiv 
ed as an unacceptable solution.
Strict enforcement of immigration law is also perceived as 
unacceptable. The costs of strict enforcement may be very 
high in terms of civil liberties and of resources devoted to en 
forcement activities. A greatly enhanced and better equipped 
staff of INS agents would be required to increase the effec 
tiveness of interior enforcement as well as border enforce 
ment, but this would be more costly. Sanctions against 
employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens are frequently 
proposed, although for employer sanctions to be effective a 
national identity system (or registration) of one sort or 
another would be required. It seems inappropriate to compel 
employers to enforce a law that the federal authorities show 
little will to enforce.
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Employer sanctions are the equivalent of an employment 
tax. This tax raises the relative cost of labor, particularly for 
low-skilled, high-turnover jobs. The imposition of such a tax 
may further worsen the job opportunities of low-skilled 
workers legally in the U.S., particularly youths and 
minorities.
But perhaps the greatest cost of strict enforcement would 
be the loss of the income the native population gains from 
the work of illegal aliens.
Conclusions—An Alternative Policy*
From the short-run perspective, the current legislative 
stalemate may be "optimal," given that we do not want a 
legal system that sanctions a two-class society one eligible 
for welfare and social service benefits and the other not. We 
can view amnesty and a stringent enforcement of immigra 
tion law as polar approaches to solving the problem, but for 
different reasons they are viewed as too costly. The conse 
quence of current policy, however, is the presence of a large 
and apparently growing segment of the population that lives 
at the margin of or outside the law. As this population 
grows, and as increasing numbers of children of illegal aliens 
are born in the U.S., and hence are U.S. citizens, the 
political and social pressures will also grow. A policy that 
looks optimal in the short run may thus not be so attractive 
in the long run.
This discussion suggests that, as a society, we need to more 
clearly delineate our priorities and policy options regarding 
illegal aliens. A partial solution to the dilemma is to restore a 
modest guest worker program. To discourage "temporary 
workers" from evolving into "permanent workers" outside 
the regular immigration system, entry would be permitted 
only for the guest workers and not for dependents, the con 
tracts would be for a short maximum number of months (say
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six months), and only for jobs with clearly defined seasonal 
patterns. Returning to the home country would be required 
before a worker could receive a new contract, and a limit 
might be placed on the total number of contracts that a 
worker could receive.
Under current policy there is some probability that an il 
legal alien will be apprehended. But the penalty if one is 
apprehended is very low, particularly for Mexican nationals 
apprehended at the border. Deportation involves little op 
portunity cost to a Mexican national apprehended at or near 
the border since he is likely to return almost immediately. 
Apprehending individuals who violate the law creates no 
deterrent effect if there is no penalty when they are ap 
prehended. Hence, current policy regarding apprehended il 
legal aliens has little or no deterrent effect, particularly 
regarding Mexican nationals.
To induce compliance, two types of penalties could be im 
posed on those who enter the country illegally, who violate 
the condition of a legal entry, or who violate the terms of 
their temporary worker contract. One penalty would be a 
probation period during which a legal entry is barred, 
whether as a temporary worker or otherwise. The other 
would be detention of the illegal worker for a period of 
several months prior to deportation.
Detention may be the only mechanism for reducing the ex 
tent to which the border is treated as a revolving door. 
Pecuniary penalties are inappropriate for the low-income il 
legal alien population because the fines could not be col 
lected. However, detention for several months would be 
costly to the alien and have a deterrent effect. Since much of 
the illegal immigration is for seasonal employment, a two or 
three month detention for a first apprehension could have a 
major impact on the incentive to seek work in the U.S. As a 
further deterrent, the length of the detention period could be
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increased with the number of times the individual has been 
apprehended.
The major criticism of detention is usually expressed in 
terms of the high cost of incarcerating "one million ap 
prehended illegal aliens.'* But this exaggerates the problem. 
Because the revolving door at the border results in multiple 
apprehensions of the same person, the number of different 
individuals apprehended is much smaller than the number of 
apprehensions. With the imposition of penalties, the number 
of attempted illegal entries would fall. As a result, the same 
border enforcement resources would mean fewer apprehen 
sions but would raise the probability that an attempted il 
legal entry would result in an apprehension further 
discouraging illegal migration. Indeed, with the imposition 
of meaningful penalties, greater deterrence could be achiev 
ed even with fewer border enforcement resources. Finally, 
low cost minimum security detention facilities could be con 
structed in rural areas near the Mexican border.
These policy recommendations will not end all illegal im 
migration. However, by providing both the opportunity and 
incentives for operating within the legal framework, they of 
fer a better hope than current policy, or the most frequently 
advocated alternatives (employer sanctions and amnesty), 
for retaining many of the benefits while reducing many of 
the costs of the current illegal immigration. The recommen 
dations offer a better prospect for regaining control over the 
U.S. borders.
NOTES
1. The Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Ser 
vice is an invaluable source of data on legal an illegal immigrants. (U.S. 
Department of Justice.)
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2. This follows from the increase in the aggregate income of the popula 
tion exceeding the earnings received by immigrants. For a clarification 
see Chiswick (1982), pp. 298-313.
3. For a fuller discussion of the policy alternatives see Cafferty, 
Chiswick, Greeley and Sullivan (1983).
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